By Yingxue Zhao, Xiaoge Meng, Shouyang Wang, T. C. Edwin Cheng
This ebook is dedicated to research and layout of offer chain contracts with stochastic call for. Given the large usage of contracts in offer chains, the problems pertaining to agreement research and layout are very important for provide chain administration (SCM), and sizeable study has been constructed to handle these matters during the last years. regardless of the abundance of classical study, new examine has to be performed according to new concerns rising with the hot altering enterprise environments, resembling the fast-shortening lifestyles cycle of product and the expanding globalization of offer chains. This publication addresses those matters, in order to current new learn on tips on how to observe contracts to enhance SCM.
Contract research and layout for provide Chains with Stochastic Demand includes 8 chapters and every bankruptcy is summarized as follows: bankruptcy 1 presents a finished overview of the classical improvement of provide chain contracts. bankruptcy 2 examines the consequences of call for uncertainty at the applicability of buyback contracts. bankruptcy three conducts a mean-risk research for wholesale fee contracts, making an allowance for contracting worth probability and probability personal tastes. bankruptcy four stories the optimization of product carrier method via franchise expense contracts within the service-oriented production offer chain with call for info asymmetry. bankruptcy five develops a bidirectional alternative agreement version and explores the optimum contracting judgements and provide chain coordination factor with the bidirectional alternative. bankruptcy 6 addresses provide chain recommendations pricing factor and a value-based pricing scheme is built for the provision chain ideas. With a cooperative online game concept strategy, bankruptcy 7 explores the problems pertaining to provide chain agreement selection/implementation with the choice agreement into consideration. bankruptcy eight concludes the publication and indicates priceless instructions for destiny research.
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Extra resources for Contract Analysis and Design for Supply Chains with Stochastic Demand
3 formulates the model. 4 characterizes the supply chain with wholesale price-only contracts. 5 characterizes the supply chain with buyback provision. 6 discusses the value of buyback for the respective supply chain members and the system. 7 examines the efficiency of buyback in coordinating the supply chain. 8 explores the effects of buyback on the retail price. 9 concludes the paper. All the proofs of the main results are put in the Appendix. 2 Literature Review To highlight the contributions included in this chapter, the review will only focus on literature that is representative and the most closely related to this chapter (namely the literature to consider buyback contracts).
For example, Gan et al. (2004) defined supply chain coordination with risk aversion in terms of Pareto-optimality criteria, which means no agent can become better off without making someone else worse off and each agent receives at least his reservation profit. This definition is a natural generalization of the standard definition in the risk-neutrality case. With this concept they developed the coordinating contracts for three specific supplier-retailer supply chains: (i) the supplier is risk neutral while the retailer maximizes his expected profit subject to a downside risk constraint; (ii) the supplier and the retailer each maximizes his own mean-variance objective function (Markowitz 1959); and (iii) the supplier and the retailer each maximizes his own expected utility.
Padmanabhan and Png (1997) considered unlimited returns with full credit from the supplier’s perspective with a model equivalent to ours. We mentioned in Sect. 2 that the buyback scheme considered by them results in a suboptimal outcome for the supplier. 11), we see that the expected profit obtained by the supplier at equilibrium with the buyback scheme considered in Padmanabhan and Png (1997) is strictly less than that with the buyback scheme considered in our research for all > 0. Hence, their buyback model is strictly dominated by ours from the supplier’s perspective.